Series 2 · Immigration

The Stop-Time Proviso

Q33Four modelsSix blind pairingsMaterial-outcome scoring

Why this result mattered

Functional tie

The principal comparison placed Qwen 3.8 and Claude under concealed A/B labels.

Both answers direct counsel to argue that residence stopped on April 20, 2021, that Idris accrued seven years, that none of the three dispositions is disqualifying or clock-stopping, and that counsel should substantiate good moral character and medical hardship through motions and documentary evidence. After ordinary verification rejects their isolated overstatements, both professionals remain on the same materially correct and safe litigation path.

Benchmark materials

Prompt and sealed key

The key is an audit reference. It was not shown to the contestant systems and did not determine the comparative verdict.

Read the original matter prompt

Question 33: The Stop-Time Proviso

Your role

You represent Idris Vale in removal proceedings under the fictional Immigration Relief Act of the Commonwealth of Rhyse. Idris seeks resident cancellation. Eligibility turns on statutory definitions, a defective charging notice, and two prior dispositions.

Governing law

Assume the following Rhyse statute applies exactly as written:

  1. A noncitizen may receive resident cancellation if the person: (a) was lawfully admitted; (b) accrued seven years of continuous residence after admission; (c) maintained good moral character during those seven years; (d) was not convicted of a disqualifying offense; and (e) proves exceptional hardship to a citizen spouse, parent, or child.

  2. Continuous residence ends on the earliest of: (a) service of a complete charging notice stating the legal charge and the date, time, and place of the first hearing; or (b) commission of a clock-stopping offense that later results in a conviction as defined in rule 4.

  3. A charging notice that omits the hearing date, time, or place is incomplete. If a later written hearing specification supplies every omitted item, residence stops on service of that later specification, not on the earlier incomplete notice.

  4. A conviction exists when there is a formal judgment, or when adjudication is withheld after a guilty or no-contest plea and the court imposes punishment, restraint, or probation. A later rehabilitative expungement does not erase the conviction. A vacatur for substantive legal invalidity does.

  5. A clock-stopping offense is only an offense listed in rule 6. Conduct outside rule 6 does not stop time, even if it produces a conviction.

  6. Disqualifying and clock-stopping offenses are: (a) fraud causing actual property loss greater than $10,000; (b) a controlled-substance offense, except one offense of simple possession of no more than 5 grams of cannabis; or (c) a crime of violence for which a sentence of at least one year is imposed.

  7. "Actual property loss" means property obtained or withheld through the offense. Investigation costs, contractual fees, and restitution imposed for collateral expenses do not count toward the $10,000 threshold.

  8. A suspended portion of a sentence counts toward the one-year sentence threshold. An offense requiring only reckless injury is not a "crime of violence" under this statute; intentional or knowing force is required.

  9. Good moral character is assessed from conduct during the seven-year residence period. A listed offense is not the only possible adverse conduct, but the decision-maker must evaluate the actual record and may not invent misconduct.

  10. Exceptional hardship requires consequences substantially beyond ordinary family separation. Medical dependency, unavailable care, and severe educational disruption may qualify when proved.

Facts

Idris was lawfully admitted on February 1, 2014. He has resided continuously since then.

On November 15, 2020, the government served a charging notice alleging overstay. The notice stated the legal charge but listed the hearing date, time, and place as "to be set." On April 20, 2021, the government served a written hearing specification giving the complete date, time, and place.

Idris has two prior dispositions:

  • In 2018, he pleaded guilty to submitting false reimbursement forms to an employer. He obtained $8,900. The criminal court ordered $11,400 in restitution, consisting of $8,900 returned property and $2,500 in audit expenses. He received six months' probation.
  • On January 5, 2021, police cited him for simple possession of 4 grams of cannabis. On March 10, 2021, he entered a guilty plea under deferred adjudication and received six months' probation. The case was expunged after completion for rehabilitation, not substantive invalidity. Idris has no other controlled-substance offense.

In 2019, Idris was also convicted of reckless injury after a bicycle collision. The statute required recklessness, not intentional force. The court imposed 14 months, all suspended, and community service.

Idris's citizen daughter, age 10, has a rare blood disorder. Her treating specialist states that Idris administers home infusions four nights per week, that no other trained caregiver is currently available, and that interruption would create a substantial hospitalization risk. The government does not dispute the medical evidence.

Idris paid restitution, completed every sentence, has maintained employment, and has no other adverse conduct in the supplied record. The government argues that the November 2020 notice stopped residence before seven years, that the cannabis disposition independently stopped time in January 2021, and that the $11,400 restitution makes the fraud offense disqualifying.

Assignment

Counsel Idris on:

  • The date continuous residence began and the date it stopped under the complete-notice rule.
  • Whether Idris accrued seven years before stop time.
  • Whether the cannabis disposition is a conviction and, separately, whether it falls within the statutory exception.
  • Whether the fraud loss exceeds $10,000 under the supplied definition.
  • Whether the reckless-injury disposition is a crime of violence, including the effect of the suspended sentence.
  • Good moral character on the supplied record.
  • Exceptional hardship.
  • The government's strongest textual arguments and the correct responses.
  • Whether Idris is statutorily eligible to apply and the concrete evidence and motion posture counsel should present.


Read the sealed key

Q33 key (Stop-Time Proviso)

  1. Residence began February 1, 2014. The November 15, 2020 notice was incomplete, so notice-based stop time occurred April 20, 2021 when the complete hearing specification was served. Missed: Idris loses more than two months of qualifying residence on a text the statute rejects.
  2. Seven years accrued February 1, 2021, before the April 20 stop date. The notice route therefore satisfies the duration element. Missed: the application is wrongly treated as statutorily barred.
  3. The deferred cannabis disposition is a conviction despite rehabilitative expungement, but it is one simple-possession offense involving 4 grams and falls within the express 5-gram exception. It is neither disqualifying nor clock-stopping. Missed: counsel conflates "conviction" with "listed offense."
  4. Fraud actual loss is $8,900. The $2,500 audit expense in restitution does not count, so the greater-than-$10,000 threshold is not met. Missed: collateral expenses turn a nonlisted fraud into a bar.
  5. The 14-month suspended sentence counts only if reckless injury is a crime of violence. It is not, because the statute requires intentional or knowing force. Missed: sentence length is analyzed without the offense definition.
  6. The supplied record supports good moral character: restitution, completed sentences, employment, and no other adverse conduct. The court may weigh the conduct but may not invent more. Missed: eligibility is conceded through generalized moral rhetoric.
  7. The undisputed medical dependency, four weekly infusions, lack of another trained caregiver, and hospitalization risk satisfy exceptional hardship on these rules. Missed: the strongest affirmative element is underdeveloped.
  8. Idris is statutorily eligible to apply. File a text-based eligibility memorandum with certified disposition records, charging documents, service proofs, loss allocation, medical declarations, caregiver evidence, and a motion rejecting the government's three threshold arguments. Missed: a winnable application never reaches discretionary consideration.
Blind evaluation record

Direct judge report

The report below is preserved from the Qwen 3.8 versus Claude verdict record.

Read the preserved judge report
TIE, FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT.

Basis. Both answers direct counsel to argue that residence stopped on April 20, 2021, that Idris accrued seven years, that none of the three dispositions is disqualifying or clock-stopping, and that counsel should substantiate good moral character and medical hardship through motions and documentary evidence. After ordinary verification rejects their isolated overstatements, both professionals remain on the same materially correct and safe litigation path.

[B] rejected: “there is no basis for a negative good-moral-character finding” — record contradicts that absolute statement by supplying three adverse dispositions for evaluation under Rule 9.
[A] rejected: the $2,500 was “not statutorily chargeable” — record lacks a rule making audit expenses invalid as restitution rather than merely excluded from Rule 7’s loss threshold.
[A] rejected: Idris “must not depart the Commonwealth” — record lacks any departure rule or post-stop-time consequence supporting that instruction.

Failed candidates. Admission-date versus day-after-admission caveat — different conduct failed; either calculation exceeds seven years.
Failed candidates. Different confidence about good moral character — different conduct failed; both recommend presenting the same rehabilitation and character evidence.
Failed candidates. Answer B’s express discretionary-relief caveat — different conduct failed; both recommend pursuing cancellation and developing equities.
Failed candidates. Different motion labels and evidentiary formulations — concrete consequence failed; both seek the same dispositive findings using the same records.
Failed candidates. Answer A’s restitution phrasing — different conduct failed after ordinary verification.
Failed candidates. Answer A’s departure instruction — record support failed.
Failed candidates. Answer A’s warning about a future second drug offense — likelihood failed on the supplied record.

Hard stop. It cannot be completed with a concrete, record-supported consequence.
Complete comparison record

All six pairings

Every pair of the four model answers was judged independently under the same evaluation instrument.

Open the six head-to-head results
PairingResultWhy it matteredRecord
Qwen 3.8 27B vs Claude Opus 5Functional tieBoth answers direct counsel to argue that residence stopped on April 20, 2021, that Idris accrued seven years, that none of the three dispositions is disqualifying or clock-stopping, and that counsel should substantiate good moral character and medical hardship through motions and documentary evidence.Judge record
Qwen 3.8 27B vs DeepSeek V4-Flash-0731Functional tieBoth answers put counsel on the same materially correct path: rely on the April 20, 2021 stop date, establish seven years, invoke the cannabis exception, exclude audit expenses from fraud loss, reject the violence classification, and pursue cancellation with moral-character and hardship evidence.Judge record
Qwen 3.8 27B vs Qwen 3.5 27BFunctional tieBoth answers direct counsel to file for resident cancellation, establish April 20, 2021 as the stop date, treat the cannabis disposition as an excepted conviction, exclude audit costs from fraud loss, reject reckless injury as a crime of violence, and prove good moral character and medical hardship with…Judge record
DeepSeek V4-Flash-0731 vs Claude Opus 5Functional tieBoth answers direct counsel to the same materially correct path: establish April 20, 2021 as the stop date, prove seven years accrued, defeat each Rule 6 theory, and present record-based evidence of good moral character and exceptional medical hardship.Judge record
DeepSeek V4-Flash-0731 vs Qwen 3.5 27BFunctional tieBoth answers place counsel on the same material path: assert stop time on April 20, 2021, establish seven years as of February 1, 2021, defeat each offense-based bar, prove good moral character and medical hardship, and proceed with the cancellation application.Judge record
Qwen 3.5 27B vs Claude Opus 5Functional tieBoth answers direct counsel to the same material path: establish April 20, 2021 as stop time, show seven years accrued, defeat each criminal disqualifier, and prove good moral character and medical hardship from the actual record.Judge record
Rejected-point diagnostic

Judge-attributed rejected points for this matter across all six pairings:

Qwen 3.8 27B2
DeepSeek V4-Flash-07311
Claude Opus 53
Qwen 3.5 27B8

This is a review-burden diagnostic, not a universal hallucination measure.

Available reasoning traces