## Bottom line On the supplied record, Idris Vale is statutorily eligible to seek resident cancellation. - **Continuous residence began:** February 1, 2014, his lawful admission. If the tribunal construes “after admission” strictly as the day after admission, the date would be February 2, 2014. The result is the same. - **Continuous residence stopped:** April 20, 2021, on service of the later complete written hearing specification under Rule 3. - **Seven-year requirement:** met. The seven-year period ended on or about February 1/2, 2021, more than two months before the April 20, 2021 stop date. - **Cannabis disposition:** yes, it is a “conviction” under Rule 4, but separately it falls within the Rule 6(b) cannabis exception. It is therefore **not** a disqualifying or clock-stopping offense. - **2018 fraud:** the actual property loss is **$8,900**, not $11,400, under Rule 7. The $2,500 in audit expenses is excluded. The fraud is therefore not a Rule 6(a) disqualifying/clock-stopping offense. - **2019 reckless injury:** not a crime of violence under Rule 8 because the statute required only recklessness, not intentional or knowing force. The 14-month suspended sentence would count toward the one-year threshold if the offense were a crime of violence, but it is not a crime of violence. - **Good moral character:** on the supplied record, Idris can establish good moral character. The record contains only limited, completed, rehabilitated conduct and no other adverse conduct. The decision-maker may not invent misconduct. - **Exceptional hardship:** strong. His citizen daughter’s rare blood disorder, need for Idris to administer home infusions four nights per week, unavailability of another trained caregiver, and substantial hospitalization risk support exceptional hardship under Rule 10. The key litigation task is to force the tribunal to apply the statute’s stop-time and offense-exception text rather than treat the November 2020 notice, the cannabis conviction, or the total restitution amount as automatic bars. --- # 1. Continuous residence: start date and stop date ## A. Start date Idris was lawfully admitted on **February 1, 2014**, and “has resided continuously since then.” Under Rule 1(b), he must accrue seven years of continuous residence after admission. The natural start date is **February 1, 2014**, the date of lawful admission and continuous residence. If the tribunal reads “after admission” strictly as beginning the day after admission, the start date is **February 2, 2014**. That stricter reading does not change the outcome, because Idris had more than seven years by the stop date. ## B. Stop date under the complete-notice rule Rule 2 provides that continuous residence ends on the earliest of: 1. service of a **complete** charging notice stating the legal charge and the date, time, and place of the first hearing; or 2. commission of a clock-stopping offense that later results in a conviction under Rule 4. The November 15, 2020 charging notice alleged overstay and stated the legal charge, but it listed the hearing date, time, and place as **“to be set.”** Rule 3 expressly provides that a charging notice omitting the hearing date, time, or place is incomplete. “To be set” is not a date, time, or place. It is an omission. The government served a later written hearing specification on **April 20, 2021**, supplying the complete date, time, and place. Rule 3 provides that if a later written hearing specification supplies every omitted item, residence stops on service of that later specification, not on the earlier incomplete notice. Therefore, under the complete-notice rule, continuous residence stopped on: > **April 20, 2021.** The government cannot rely on the November 15, 2020 notice to stop residence. That notice was incomplete as a matter of statutory text. ## C. No earlier stop from a clock-stopping offense Rule 2(b) could have stopped residence earlier if Idris committed a Rule 6 clock-stopping offense that later resulted in a Rule 4 conviction. On the supplied record, none of Idris’s dispositions is a Rule 6 clock-stopping offense: - The 2018 fraud did not cause actual property loss greater than $10,000 under Rule 7. - The 2021 cannabis possession falls within the Rule 6(b) exception. - The 2019 reckless injury is not a crime of violence under Rule 8. Because there is no clock-stopping offense, Rule 2(b) does not produce an earlier stop date. The only stop date is the April 20, 2021 service of the complete hearing specification. --- # 2. Whether Idris accrued seven years before stop time Yes. Using the most straightforward calculation: - Start: **February 1, 2014** - Seven-year anniversary: **February 1, 2021** - Stop date: **April 20, 2021** From February 1, 2021 to April 20, 2021, Idris had approximately **two months and nineteen days** of additional continuous residence. Even under the stricter day-after-admission calculation: - Start: **February 2, 2014** - Seven-year anniversary: **February 2, 2021** - Stop date: **April 20, 2021** The result is identical: Idris accrued more than seven years before continuous residence stopped. The government’s November 2020 stop-date theory would make Idris fall short by about two and a half months. But that theory fails because the November notice was incomplete under Rule 3. --- # 3. Prior dispositions: conviction status and statutory effect ## A. 2018 fraud disposition ### Facts In 2018, Idris pleaded guilty to submitting false reimbursement forms to an employer. He obtained **$8,900**. The court ordered **$11,400** in restitution, consisting of: - $8,900 returned property; and - $2,500 in audit expenses. He received six months’ probation. ### Is it a conviction? The supplied record does not state that adjudication was withheld, and it describes a guilty plea followed by probation. It is best treated as a conviction for purposes of the record, even though that point is not decisive. ### Is it a disqualifying or clock-stopping offense? No. Rule 6(a) lists only: > fraud causing actual property loss greater than $10,000. Rule 7 defines “actual property loss” as: > property obtained or withheld through the offense. Rule 7 further provides that investigation costs, contractual fees, and restitution imposed for collateral expenses do **not** count toward the $10,000 threshold. Here, the property obtained through the offense was **$8,900**. The $2,500 in audit expenses was collateral/investigation cost, not property obtained or withheld through the fraud. Therefore, the actual property loss is **$8,900**, not $11,400. The fraud does not exceed the $10,000 threshold. It is not a Rule 6(a) offense. Because Rule 5 provides that conduct outside Rule 6 does not stop time even if it produces a conviction, the 2018 fraud does not stop continuous residence and is not a disqualifying offense under Rule 1(d). ### Good moral character impact The 2018 fraud may be considered adverse conduct under Rule 9, but it is not a categorical bar. On the supplied record, Idris paid restitution, completed the sentence, maintained employment, and has no other adverse conduct. Those facts support a positive good-moral-character finding. --- ## B. 2021 cannabis disposition ### Facts On January 5, 2021, police cited Idris for simple possession of **4 grams** of cannabis. On March 10, 2021, he entered a guilty plea under deferred adjudication and received six months’ probation. The case was expunged after completion for rehabilitation, not substantive invalidity. Idris has no other controlled-substance offense. ## 1. Is it a conviction under Rule 4? Yes. Rule 4 provides that a conviction exists when: - there is a formal judgment, or - adjudication is withheld after a guilty or no-contest plea and the court imposes punishment, restraint, or probation. Here, Idris pleaded guilty, adjudication was withheld through deferred adjudication, and the court imposed six months’ probation. That satisfies Rule 4. The later rehabilitative expungement does **not** erase the conviction. Rule 4 expressly provides that a later rehabilitative expungement does not erase a conviction. Only a vacatur for substantive legal invalidity does. So counsel should **concede** that the cannabis disposition is a conviction under Rule 4. Arguing otherwise would conflict with the text and would weaken credibility. ## 2. Does it fall within the statutory exception? Yes. Rule 6(b) lists as disqualifying and clock-stopping: > a controlled-substance offense, except one offense of simple possession of no more than 5 grams of cannabis. Idris’s offense was: - simple possession; - 4 grams of cannabis; - no more than 5 grams; - one controlled-substance offense; - with no other controlled-substance offense. Therefore, the cannabis disposition falls within the Rule 6(b) exception. Because it is within the exception, it is **not** a listed disqualifying or clock-stopping offense under Rule 6. Rule 5 then controls: conduct outside Rule 6 does not stop time, even if it produces a conviction. ### Consequence The cannabis disposition is: - a conviction under Rule 4; **but** - not a disqualifying offense under Rule 1(d); and - not a clock-stopping offense under Rule 2(b). The expungement is not the reason Idris wins on this point. The statutory exception is. --- ## C. 2019 reckless-injury disposition ### Facts In 2019, Idris was convicted of reckless injury after a bicycle collision. The statute required **recklessness**, not intentional force. The court imposed 14 months, all suspended, and community service. ### Is it a crime of violence under Rule 6(c)? No. Rule 6(c) lists: > a crime of violence for which a sentence of at least one year is imposed. Rule 8 provides: > An offense requiring only reckless injury is not a “crime of violence” under this statute; intentional or knowing force is required. The supplied record states that the offense required recklessness, not intentional force. Therefore, it is not a crime of violence under the statute. ### Effect of the suspended 14-month sentence Rule 8 also provides that a suspended portion of a sentence counts toward the one-year threshold. So if the offense had been a crime of violence, the 14-month suspended sentence would have satisfied the “at least one year” requirement. But that point is irrelevant because the offense is not a crime of violence. ### Consequence The reckless-injury conviction is not a Rule 6(c) offense. It is not a disqualifying offense and not a clock-stopping offense. --- # 4. Good moral character on the supplied record Rule 9 provides: > Good moral character is assessed from conduct during the seven-year residence period. A listed offense is not the only possible adverse conduct, but the decision-maker must evaluate the actual record and may not invent misconduct. The supplied record contains three dispositions during the relevant period: 1. 2018 fraud, not a disqualifying offense because actual loss was $8,900; 2. 2019 reckless injury, not a crime of violence; 3. 2021 cannabis possession, a conviction but within the statutory exception. The record also contains strong positive evidence: - Idris paid restitution. - He completed every sentence. - He maintained employment. - He has no other adverse conduct in the supplied record. - The cannabis case was rehabilitatively expunged after completion. On the supplied record, there is no basis for a negative good-moral-character finding. The government may point to the 2018 fraud and the 2021 cannabis conviction as adverse conduct, but the statute does not make them categorical bars. It requires evaluation of the actual record. The actual record shows limited, isolated, completed, rehabilitated conduct and no other adverse behavior. Counsel should argue that Idris meets the good-moral-character requirement. If the government wants to deny good moral character, it must point to specific record facts, not merely the existence of prior dispositions. --- # 5. Exceptional hardship Rule 10 provides: > Exceptional hardship requires consequences substantially beyond ordinary family separation. Medical dependency, unavailable care, and severe educational disruption may qualify when proved. Idris’s citizen daughter, age 10, has a rare blood disorder. The treating specialist states that: - Idris administers home infusions four nights per week; - no other trained caregiver is currently available; - interruption would create a substantial hospitalization risk. The government does not dispute the medical evidence. This is not ordinary family separation. It is direct medical dependency. If Idris is removed, his daughter would lose the only trained caregiver identified in the record for a life-sustaining or life-stabilizing home medical regimen. The consequence is a substantial hospitalization risk, not merely emotional distress from separation. Counsel should present this as a strong Rule 10 case. The medical dependency and unavailable-care prongs appear satisfied on the supplied record. The severe-educational-disruption prong can also be supported, if needed, by evidence that hospitalization or loss of Idris’s caregiving would disrupt the daughter’s schooling. --- # 6. The government’s strongest textual arguments and correct responses ## A. Argument: The November 15, 2020 notice stopped residence because it was a charging notice alleging overstay. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may argue that the November notice was a “charging notice” because it stated the legal charge. The “to be set” language may be characterized as a placeholder for a future hearing, not a fatal omission. ### Correct response Rule 3 is explicit: a charging notice that omits the hearing date, time, or place is incomplete. “To be set” is not a date, time, or place. It is the statutory omission that Rule 3 addresses. Rule 3 further provides that if a later written hearing specification supplies every omitted item, residence stops on service of that later specification. The April 20, 2021 specification supplied the missing date, time, and place. Therefore, residence stopped on **April 20, 2021**, not November 15, 2020. This is the strongest of Idris’s arguments because it is almost entirely textual. --- ## B. Argument: The cannabis disposition stopped residence in January 2021. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may argue: - the offense was a controlled-substance offense; - Idris committed it on January 5, 2021; - it later resulted in a Rule 4 conviction on March 10, 2021; - therefore continuous residence stopped on commission, January 5, 2021, under Rule 2(b); - January 5, 2021 was before the seven-year anniversary, so Idris fails the seven-year requirement. ### Correct response The government may be right that the disposition is a Rule 4 conviction. But Rule 6(b) expressly excludes: > one offense of simple possession of no more than 5 grams of cannabis. Idris’s offense was simple possession of 4 grams of cannabis. He has no other controlled-substance offense. Therefore, the offense is not a listed Rule 6 offense. Rule 5 provides that conduct outside Rule 6 does not stop time, even if it produces a conviction. So the cannabis disposition does not stop residence. The government’s strongest response to this argument is the statutory exception itself. --- ## C. Argument: The $11,400 restitution shows fraud causing actual property loss greater than $10,000. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may point to the restitution order: $11,400. It may argue that the amount ordered as restitution demonstrates actual property loss above the $10,000 threshold. ### Correct response Rule 7 controls the measure of actual property loss. It defines actual property loss as property obtained or withheld through the offense. It expressly excludes investigation costs, contractual fees, and restitution imposed for collateral expenses. Here, the order itself is itemized: - $8,900 returned property; - $2,500 audit expenses. Only the $8,900 returned property counts. The $2,500 in audit expenses is collateral/investigation cost and is excluded. The actual property loss is therefore **$8,900**, not $11,400. The fraud does not satisfy Rule 6(a). Counsel should concede that the restitution order exists and totals $11,400, but argue that Rule 7 requires exclusion of the $2,500 from the statutory threshold. --- ## D. Argument: The 2019 reckless-injury conviction involved a 14-month suspended sentence, so it satisfies the one-year sentence requirement. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may argue that the sentence was 14 months, all suspended, and Rule 8 says the suspended portion counts. Therefore, the one-year requirement is satisfied. ### Correct response That is true only if the offense is a crime of violence. But Rule 8 also provides that an offense requiring only reckless injury is not a crime of violence unless intentional or knowing force is required. The supplied record says the 2019 offense required recklessness, not intentional force. Therefore, it is not a crime of violence. The suspended-sentence point is a red herring. Counsel should concede that the 14-month suspended sentence counts if the offense were a crime of violence, but then emphasize that the offense is not a crime of violence under Rule 8. --- ## E. Argument: The multiple convictions show bad moral character. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may argue that a series of guilty pleas—2018 fraud, 2019 reckless injury, 2021 cannabis possession—negatively establishes conduct inconsistent with good moral character. ### Correct response Rule 9 permits consideration of non-listed adverse conduct, but it also requires evaluation of the actual record and forbids inventing misconduct. On the supplied record: - none of the dispositions is a listed disqualifying offense; - the fraud was below the statutory loss threshold; - the cannabis offense falls within the statutory exception; - the reckless injury is not a crime of violence; - Idris completed all sentences; - he paid restitution; - he maintained employment; - the record contains no other adverse conduct. The government may point to the convictions, but it cannot rely on an unexplained presumption. It must point to specific record facts showing that Idris lacks good moral character. On the supplied record, it has no strong factual basis. --- ## F. Argument: The hardship is just ordinary family separation. ### Government’s strongest textual theory The government may argue that any parent-child separation produces hardship, but cancellation requires consequences substantially beyond ordinary separation. ### Correct response This is not ordinary separation. The record shows direct medical dependency: - rare blood disorder; - home infusions four nights per week; - Idris is the caregiver identified by the treating specialist; - no other trained caregiver is currently available; - interruption creates substantial hospitalization risk. Rule 10 specifically identifies medical dependency and unavailable care as potentially qualifying. The government does not dispute the medical evidence. The hardship is concrete, medically documented, and substantially beyond ordinary emotional distress from family separation. --- # 7. Statutory eligibility checklist Idris satisfies each statutory predicate on the supplied record. | Requirement | Rule | Application | |---|---:|---| | Lawfully admitted | Rule 1(a) | Yes. Lawfully admitted February 1, 2014. | | Seven years continuous residence after admission | Rule 1(b) | Yes. Residence began February 1, 2014; stopped April 20, 2021. Seven years completed on or about February 1/2, 2021. | | Good moral character during seven years | Rule 1(c) | Yes on supplied record. Limited adverse conduct, all completed and rehabilitated; no other adverse conduct; government may not invent misconduct. | | Not convicted of a disqualifying offense | Rule 1(d) | Yes. Fraud under $10,000 actual loss; cannabis within exception; reckless injury not a crime of violence. | | Exceptional hardship to citizen child | Rule 1(e) | Yes. Citizen daughter has rare blood disorder; Idris is essential trained caregiver; removal creates substantial hospitalization risk. | Therefore, Idris is **statutorily eligible to apply** for resident cancellation. Because the statute says a noncitizen “may receive” cancellation, the final grant may remain discretionary. But on the supplied record, Idris has a strong statutory claim and a strong equitable/hardship record. --- # 8. Concrete evidence counsel should present ## A. Lawful admission and continuous residence Present evidence that Idris was lawfully admitted on February 1, 2014, and continuously resided in Rhyse from that date through April 20, 2021. Possible exhibits: - admission record; - passport and entry stamps; - lease agreements; - utility bills; - bank records; - tax returns; - employment records; - school records for daughter; - medical records; - affidavits from neighbors, employers, landlords, or community members; - no-travel or travel records consistent with continuous residence. The residence evidence should cover the full period from **February 1, 2014 through April 20, 2021**. --- ## B. Charging notice and complete hearing specification Present the two documents: 1. November 15, 2020 charging notice showing: - legal charge: overstay; - hearing date, time, and place: “to be set.” 2. April 20, 2021 written hearing specification showing: - complete date; - complete time; - complete place. Also present proof of service for the April 20, 2021 specification, because the stop date depends on service. Request a finding that: > The November 15, 2020 notice was incomplete under Rule 3. Continuous residence stopped on service of the April 20, 2021 hearing specification. --- ## C. 2018 fraud disposition Present: - indictment or complaint; - plea transcript or written plea; - judgment or sentencing order; - restitution order itemizing: - $8,900 returned property; - $2,500 audit expenses; - proof of restitution payment; - proof of probation completion. Request a finding that: > The actual property loss under Rule 7 was $8,900. The $2,500 in audit expenses is excluded. The offense is not a Rule 6(a) fraud causing actual property loss greater than $10,000. --- ## D. 2021 cannabis disposition Present: - police citation showing simple possession of 4 grams of cannabis; - plea documents showing deferred adjudication and guilty plea; - probation order; - expungement certificate showing rehabilitative expungement; - certificate of no other controlled-substance offense or clean record showing no other controlled-substance conviction. Counsel should concede: > The disposition is a conviction under Rule 4, and the expungement does not erase it. Then argue: > The offense is within the Rule 6(b) exception because it is one offense of simple possession of no more than 5 grams of cannabis, and Idris has no other controlled-substance offense. Therefore, it is not a disqualifying or clock-stopping offense. --- ## E. 2019 reckless-injury disposition Present: - indictment or complaint; - statutory text or judicial notice material showing the offense required recklessness; - plea/conviction documents; - sentencing order showing 14 months, all suspended, and community service; - proof of completion. Request a finding that: > The offense required recklessness, not intentional or knowing force. Under Rule 8, it is not a crime of violence. Therefore, it is not a Rule 6(c) offense. Counsel should concede: > The suspended 14-month sentence would count toward the one-year threshold if the offense were a crime of violence. Then emphasize: > But it is not a crime of violence under Rule 8. --- ## F. Good moral character evidence Present evidence that Idris has good moral character during the relevant period. Possible exhibits: - employment records; - tax returns; - no-arrest or no-criminal-history certification, to the extent available; - character letters from employer, neighbors, clergy, teachers, or community leaders; - restitution receipts; - probation completion certificates; - community service completion; - evidence of stable housing; - evidence of caregiving for daughter. The argument should be: - the record contains no other adverse conduct; - the listed dispositions are not disqualifying; - the adverse conduct was limited and rehabilitated; - the government may not invent misconduct. --- ## G. Exceptional hardship evidence Present evidence of the daughter’s citizenship and medical condition. Possible exhibits: - daughter’s birth certificate; - citizenship evidence; - relationship evidence; - treating specialist declaration; - medical records; - home infusion schedule; - medication/order records; - statement that no other trained caregiver is currently available; - statement about substantial hospitalization risk; - school records or teacher declaration showing educational disruption if Idris is removed; - evidence of cost or infeasibility of alternative care. The specialist declaration should be central. It should state: - diagnosis; - treatment protocol; - frequency of Idris’s involvement; - why Idris is essential; - why no other trained caregiver is available; - medical consequences of interruption. Because the government does not dispute the medical evidence, counsel should emphasize that the hardship is effectively established. --- # 9. Motion posture and recommended filings ## A. Threshold motion: stop-time ruling File a pre-hearing motion, memorandum, or proposed order seeking a threshold finding that: 1. the November 15, 2020 charging notice was incomplete under Rule 3; 2. the April 20, 2021 written hearing specification supplied every omitted item; 3. continuous residence stopped on April 20, 2021; 4. Idris accrued seven years of continuous residence before that date. This is the dispositive procedural issue. If the tribunal accepts the November 2020 stop date, Idris fails the seven-year requirement. If the tribunal accepts the April 20, 2021 stop date, Idris meets it. --- ## B. Motion or proposed findings on prior dispositions Seek findings that: 1. the 2018 fraud caused actual property loss of $8,900 under Rule 7 and is not a Rule 6(a) offense; 2. the 2021 cannabis disposition is a Rule 4 conviction but falls within the Rule 6(b) exception and is not a disqualifying or clock-stopping offense; 3. the 2019 reckless-injury conviction is not a crime of violence under Rule 8 and is not a Rule 6(c) offense. This prevents the government from treating any of the dispositions as automatic bars. --- ## C. Motion in support of cancellation of removal File a full application for resident cancellation with a memorandum that walks through Rules 1 through 10. The memorandum should argue: - Idris was lawfully admitted. - He accrued more than seven years of continuous residence. - He has good moral character. - He has no disqualifying conviction. - He has proved exceptional hardship to his citizen daughter. --- ## D. Evidence admission motions Move to admit: - the November and April notices; - certified criminal disposition documents; - restitution and sentencing orders; - expungement certificate; - medical records; - specialist declaration; - citizenship and relationship documents; - residence and character evidence. If the government objects to any exhibit, be prepared to explain relevance and authentication. --- ## E. Proposed order language Counsel can propose findings such as: > The Tribunal finds that the November 15, 2020 charging notice was incomplete because it did not state the date, time, and place of the first hearing. The April 20, 2021 hearing specification supplied the omitted items. Continuous residence stopped on April 20, 2021. Idris accrued seven years of continuous residence before that date. > The Tribunal finds that the 2018 fraud involved actual property loss of $8,900 under Rule 7 and is not a disqualifying offense. > The Tribunal finds that the 2021 cannabis possession is a conviction under Rule 4, but it is within the Rule 6(b) exception for one offense of simple possession of no more than 5 grams of cannabis. It is not a disqualifying or clock-stopping offense. > The Tribunal finds that the 2019 reckless-injury offense required recklessness and is not a crime of violence under Rule 8. > The Tribunal finds that Idris has good moral character during the relevant period based on the supplied record. > The Tribunal finds that exceptional hardship exists to Idris’s citizen daughter based on the undisputed medical evidence. --- # 10. Litigation strategy: what to concede and what to fight ## Concede Concede the points that are textually clear: 1. The November 2020 notice was a charging notice, but it was incomplete. 2. The cannabis disposition is a conviction under Rule 4. 3. The cannabis expungement did not erase the conviction. 4. The 14-month suspended sentence would count toward the one-year threshold if the reckless-injury offense were a crime of violence. 5. The 2018 fraud and 2019 reckless injury may be considered in good moral character. Conceding these points preserves credibility and narrows the case to the decisive textual exceptions. ## Fight Fight these points: 1. The November 2020 notice did not stop residence. 2. The cannabis offense is not a listed offense because of the Rule 6(b) exception. 3. The fraud loss is not $11,400 for statutory purposes. 4. The reckless-injury offense is not a crime of violence. 5. The record does not support a negative good-moral-character finding. 6. The hardship is not ordinary family separation. --- # Final recommendation Counsel should proceed with Idris’s application for resident cancellation. The case is strong on the supplied record. The winning narrative is: 1. The statute does not allow residence to stop on an incomplete charging notice. The stop date is April 20, 2021. 2. Idris had more than seven years of continuous residence before that date. 3. None of his dispositions is a listed disqualifying or clock-stopping offense. 4. His good-moral-character record is positive and rehabilitation-focused. 5. His citizen daughter would face substantial medical harm without his care. The government’s strongest arguments are defeated by the statute’s own text: Rule 3 for the notice, Rule 6(b) for the cannabis exception, Rule 7 for the fraud-loss threshold, and Rule 8 for the reckless-injury definition.